Introduction
The Kingdom of Thailand"s southern provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala originally formed the center of the tribute paying Malay Sultanate of Patani Darul Makrif. 1 Thailand annexed these provinces in 1902 2 sparking a primarily ethnic Malay insurgency against the government in Bangkok. This ethnic insurgency continued to modern times when, after a period of successful rapprochement in 2000, the Thai government deemed the insurgency defeated. 3 In 2004, after five years of relative peace in the southern provinces, the insurgency returned in a more violent Jihadist form. 4 Wracked by political turmoil, the Thai government was unable to respond in a consistent manner, initially denying the insurgency and then overreacting. 5 The Thai government"s violent abuses in dealing with the return of the insurgency tended to turn Muslim public support away from the government in Bangkok at the same time as pressure from Jihadists was destabilizing the governance of southern villages and creating a shadow Islamic government.
The Russian experience in Chechnya in some ways parallels this history. The Chechen insurgency began as an attempt by a significant ethnic enclave to assert its independence from
Moscow. Due in large part to the success of the Russian government"s violent suppression of the insurgency, the struggle in Chechnya transformed into a Jihad. While the regional pressures and governmental conditions vary greatly between the Chechen and southern Thailand cases, the subscript of an ethnic insurgency that is declared defeated by the government and reawakens as a The overall methodology used in this monograph will be a comparative case study of most dissimilar systems. The two systems of interest are the insurgency in the Russian province of Chechnya and the insurgency in Patani, the three southern Thailand provinces of Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani. These cases were chosen based on dissimilarities of their history, geography, and the strategy employed by the dominant party against the insurgent. They also share the modern perception of similarity of form in that both insurgencies seemingly began as separatist movements centered on ethnicity and seemingly transformed into Islamist separatist movements. While the secessionist movements share a broadly common religious identity, Islam, the dominant party religions which feed into the government"s own interpretation of the secession movements, Christianity in Russia and Buddhism in Thailand, are very different in interpretation and focus.
The cases will be developed in the following sections. The first section will be an overview of the literature available to develop the history and analysis of the cases. The next section will be an explanation of the method and analysis to be used. The third section will focus on Chechnya.
Subsections will present an overview of the history of Chechnya and its experience with Russia and modern Russian efforts to counteract the insurgency in Chechnya. This includes an analysis of both phases of the Chechen insurgency as well as possible motivations for the separate phases of the counterinsurgency efforts. The final subsection in the Chechen case will compile the lessons learned.
The fourth section focuses on Southern Thailand. It will largely mirror the Russian subsections exploring the history of Patani in phases. Subsections will cover the history of Patani, its incorporation into the main Thai state, the development of Thai rule and the modern insurgency. These sections will include the cultural separation of the southern Thai Muslims, the treatment of the Patani people and efforts to assimilate southern Muslims into the Thai identity. This section will end with an analysis and lessons learned from the Patani case.
The final section will be the conclusion wherein common threads will be compiled to explore similarities, differences, and lessons learned from each case. Overarching lessons learned which may be applied to all counterinsurgency operations and applications will be proposed as well as any areas for continued study or further development.
Literature Review
The history of both Chechnya and Patani are provided as a foundation preceding the analysis of the two insurgent case studies. This literature is of varied depth and requires the review of several sources to ensure that no pertinent data is omitted by the over reliance on a single source. Literature on the analysis of the conflicts is also explored. One shortcoming of the literature is that more information from a larger variety of viewpoints and sources is available on Patani than on Chechnya.
Scholarly historical works on the history and culture of Chechnya starting before the major Russian interactions in the 18 th century are difficult to find. Works readily available on Chechnya tend to focus on the analysis of aspects of the modern insurgency, such as the use of airpower or specific counterinsurgency tactics, and begin their historical analysis in the modern Russian era. These works neglect the historical context of the insurgency, how the Chechen people came to be, how they view their religion, detailed discussion of their evolution of Chechen culture, or the reasons for Chechen resistance to Russian expansion. While data is available on the internet regarding the history of the conflict, it is not scholarly work, but rather undocumented timelines on Chechen websites or other popular works such as a Public Broadcasting Company documentary. Some of the most detailed writings are unsigned and unannotated. While the reasons for this are beyond the scope of this monograph, it is worthwhile to note the absence of in depth writings and analysis. This is especially noteworthy when viewed in light of the differences in strategies employed by Russia and Thailand in the combating the insurgencies in Patani and
Chechnya and when compared to the amount of work available on the insurgency in Southern
Thailand.
Much work analyzing the modern Chechen insurgency and its cultural underpinnings has been done in Russian by Russian researchers. Little of this is available to the non-Russian holistic way, presenting a broad look at multiple influences and perception of the development of the conflict. In the same way the Harish work is a comprehensive working paper exploring much of the same subject selected for one of the cases in this study.
Amnesty International, Human Rights watch and the International Crisis Group works focus on the conduct of the current insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts. These works focus on what they perceive to be the actions and motivations of the government and the insurgents. In addition to the analysis and research of these groups, they include conclusions and recommendations for the international community as well as the Thai government. While the research found in these works is fairly comprehensive, each of these groups presents a viewpoint that must be carefully analyzed before using the facts presented.
Methodology
The overall methodology used in this monograph will be a comparative case study of most dissimilar systems. The two systems of interest are the insurgency in the Russian province of Chechnya and the insurgency in the three southern Thailand provinces of Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani. These cases were chosen based on dissimilarities of history and the strategy employed by the dominant party against the insurgent and the similarity of their superficial modern perception of form in that they began as a separatist movement centered on ethnicity and transformed into a religion centered separatist movement. The cases also share a broadly common religious identity.
The cases will be developed in the following sections. The first section will be an overview of the history of Chechnya and its experience with Russia. This will include the geography, ethnic makeup, traditions and governance of the region. The history will also include an analysis of the The cases will be examined specifically to explore the background and basis for the insurgency in the respective cultures. The focus of the analysis will transition to the decisions made by the respective governments with respect to strategy and engagement at the beginning of the insurgency. Later, the paper will analyze the escalation and shifts in strategy and the perception of the reconcilable population, those only tangentially involved or not active in the insurgency. Common threads will be explored to develop criteria for comparison and to develop caveats for the proper translation of the two experiences. The caveats of translating the experiences in discrete insurgencies gleaned from culturally and environmentally disparate areas will factor heavily into the veracity of the lessons and the application of those lessons going forward. Overarching lessons learned for future U.S. counterinsurgency strategy and applications will be proposed as well as any areas for continued study or further development.
Chechnya
Chechnya 
Pre-Russian History
The beginnings of recorded organized foreign invasion into Chechnya date back to the Thirteenth century. The mountains of the Caucasus, comprising the highlands of modern Chechnya, were an ungoverned area while the Russian steppes were ruled by the Turkic Kypchak there was any opportunity for education, it was limited to memorization of the Qur"an, the reforms were implemented by the government without local or religious assistance.
Russians in Chechnya
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As school reform spread through Thailand in the early twentieth century, the government implemented four years of compulsory education in public schools. 75 The 1921 Education Act enacted compulsory attendance and required schools that wished to receive public assistance to meet minimum requirements including administering education in the Thai language. King Rama VI campaigned intensely to consolidate a Thai national identity. School reform and a common national curriculum was one of his best tools. In 1922 a serious rebellion occurred. Whereas most rebellions had been the province of the elites or some of the hajjis, religious leaders, protesting the new law structure, the 1922 rebellion had a much wider base including many Malay nobility 72 Aphornsuvan, "History and Politics of the Muslims in Thailand," 15. We Malays are conscious that we have been brought under Siamese rule by defeat. The term "Thai Islam" with which we are known by the Siamese government reminds us of this defeat and is therefore no appreciated by us. We therefore beg of the government to honor us with the title of Malay Muslims so that we may be recognized as distinct from Thai by the outside world. 94 Harish, Changing Conflict Identities, 8. 95 Ibid., 9.
reforms, but they were few and only grudgingly implemented. 96 The The Chechen would have no more choices or opportunity under that eventuality than they have ever had in their history of insurgency.
Containment through the use of indigenous elements to marginalize and undermine the legitimacy of the insurgents has been tried extensively in Patani, alternating with addressing the roots of the problem. In this strategy, the roots of the problem are not corrected. Instead the government seeks out anyone in the insurgent"s power base that is so tired of violence that they are amiable to reconciling with the government in order to stop the bloodshed. The Thai government has not had much success in maintaining the success of this strategy over the long term. The typical experience is that the insurgents regroup and direct their efforts against the reconcilable leaders. Without addressing the roots of the insurgency younger generations, not as tired of the bloodshed, become radicalized and join the insurgency. While containment can work to give the government time to address the roots of the problems, pure containment will not work as a long term solution.
The only strategy that has demonstrated the ability to develop peace in the long term is to address the roots of the inequalities that perpetuate a separate victimized identity in the insurgent base. After years of unevenly addressing the economic and social problems in Patani, the government started to realize peace and stability in the South of Thailand. Unfortunately later 125 Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, 3. governments, noticeably Thaksin Shinawatra, reduced the emphasis on addressing the rots of the problem and focused on eradication. While not solely at fault for the resurgence of unrest in Patani, this strategy undoubtedly led to a rise in radicalization in the insurgent base.
In both cases the insurgents use Jihad to add legitimacy and appeal to their cause. Both insurgencies predate the introduction of Islam into the area. Both insurgent bases tend to be less pious than the insurgents claim to be to the extent that the very Jihadi nature of the insurgency tends to split the insurgents from their base.
The lessons learned from the comparison of the two conflicts is of the commonality of the end state between a repressive unsupportable strategy focusing on collective punishment and a reconciliation, containment, and development strategy that is unevenly or ineptly applied for even a short while. Another lesson is the fragility of security in a containment insurgent environment. In the case of Chechnya only a continuous application of force or terror can maintain the status quo, especially in light of the failure to deliver rebuilding and economic development programs promised by Moscow. In the case of Patani, the government shifted to an inferior strategy by abandoning the strategies that minimized the violence through the 1980s and 1990. This set the stage for the degradation of security which, coupled with tactical mistakes in employing paramilitary troops and maintaining accountability for state abuses, has allowed the situation to spiral.
For U.S. counterinsurgency strategy the lessons presented by these case studies are many.
The first is that, even when the insurgents claim a religious war, a careful study of the deep roots of the conflict and the culture of the insurgent"s base may expose the lie in the Jihadi"s claims.
The next is that there is no answer to these insurgencies in the application of military force.
Among the strategies analyzed, only consistently applied development to address the roots of the insurgent problems is a long term path to peace and stability. Using terror against terror or attempting to contain the insurgency may yield short term gains. Terror, however, gives no guarantee of peace or a solution to the insurgency. Containment may work by itself in the short
